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Properties

Conditional expectation inherits the structural properties of the integral (linearity, monotonicity, monotone convergence) and adds a few of its own (tower property, take-out-what-is-known, independence). All the proofs reduce to checking the two conditions in the definition: G\cG-measurability and the integration identity on G\cG-events.

Throughout this page, (Ω,F,P)(\Omega, \cF, \Pr) is a probability space, G⊆F\cG \subseteq \cF is a sub-σ\sigma-field, and "E(⋅∣G)\E(\cdot \mid \cG)" refers to any version of the conditional expectation.

The analogous conditional Fatou and conditional dominated convergence theorems follow by the same machine (apply the unconditional versions inside ∫A⋅ dP\int_A \cdot \, d\Pr and translate via the integration identity).

The reading: if YY carries no information about XX, then conditioning on YY is the same as not conditioning at all.

This is the opposite extreme of the independence case: if XX is already measurable in G\cG, then G\cG carries all the information about XX and conditioning is the identity.

Specializing to F1={∅,Ω}\cF_1 = \{\emptyset, \Omega\} (the trivial σ\sigma-field) gives the law of iterated expectations:

E ⁣[E(X∣G)]  =  E[X].\E\!\big[ \E(X \mid \cG) \big] \;=\; \E[X].

Averaging the conditional expectation against the full distribution recovers the unconditional expectation.

Note that this is the same indicator-simple-non-negative-general progression used to define the Lebesgue integral itself. Every “extend to integrable ff” argument in measure theory looks the same.