Skip to content

Properties

Conditional expectation inherits the structural properties of the integral (linearity, monotonicity, monotone convergence) and adds a few of its own (tower property, take-out-what-is-known, independence). All the proofs reduce to checking the two conditions in the definition: G\cG-measurability and the integration identity on G\cG-events.

Throughout this page, (Ω,F,P)(\Omega, \cF, \Pr) is a probability space, GF\cG \subseteq \cF is a sub-σ\sigma-field, and "E(G)\E(\cdot \mid \cG)" refers to any version of the conditional expectation.

The analogous conditional Fatou and conditional dominated convergence theorems follow by the same machine (apply the unconditional versions inside AdP\int_A \cdot \, d\Pr and translate via the integration identity).

The reading: if YY carries no information about XX, then conditioning on YY is the same as not conditioning at all.

This is the opposite extreme of the independence case: if XX is already measurable in G\cG, then G\cG carries all the information about XX and conditioning is the identity.

Specializing to F1={,Ω}\cF_1 = \{\emptyset, \Omega\} (the trivial σ\sigma-field) gives the law of iterated expectations:

E ⁣[E(XG)]  =  E[X].\E\!\big[ \E(X \mid \cG) \big] \;=\; \E[X].

Averaging the conditional expectation against the full distribution recovers the unconditional expectation.

Note that this is the same indicator-simple-non-negative-general progression used to define the Lebesgue integral itself. Every “extend to integrable ff” argument in measure theory looks the same.